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1Q. This  Communication  seeks  to  chart  a  long-run  course  for  EU-China  relations  into  lhe  21st 
century. 
The rise of China is  unmatched amongst national experiences since the Second World War. 
Japan  has  made  its  mark  as  an  economic power,  the  Soviet  Union  survived essentially  as  a 
military power.  China is  increasingly strong in bolh the military-political  and  lhe economic 
spheres.  China is  in  the  midst of sustained and dramatic economic and social change at 
home.  Abroad. China is becoming part of the world security and economic system at  a time 
of  greater  economic  interdependence  and  when  global  problems,  from  protection  of  the 
environment to  nuclear non-proliferation,  require coordinated commitment from  government<; 
worldwide.  China  is  seeking  integration  into  international  structures:  China  has  been  a 
member of the IMF and the World Bank since the early 1980s; it  participates in regional fora 
such as APEC, and is actively negotiating membership of the World Trade Organisation.  China 
made an important contribution to the results of the World Conference on Human Rights held 
in  Vienna in  June  1993.  China will  also host a major UN  conference on women in  Beijing 
later this year. 
It  is  20 years since diplomatic relations were established between the EC and China, and  10 
years  since  the  signing  of the  existing  Trade  and  Cooperation  Agreement.  The  steady 
development  of bilateral  relations  was  interrupted  by  the  1989  Tiananmen  Square  events. 
Europe, like other major intemationa.I partners of China, reacted with a range of sanctions.  But 
the  normalisation of relations,  particularly in  the past three years,  has  paved  the  way  for  a 
renewed  surge  in  bilateral  trade  and  investment.  1994  also saw  major  strides  in  bilateral 
cooperation and the establishment of a new arrangement for political dialogue. 
The time has come to redefine the EU's relationship with China, in the spirit of the "new Asia 
strategy"  endorsed  by  the  Essen  European  Council.  Europe  must  develop  a  long-term 
relationship with China that reflects China's worldwide, as well  as  regional, economic and 
political influence.  Europe's relations with China are bound to be a cornerstone in Europe's 
external relations, both with Asia and globally.  Europe needs an action-oriented, not a merely 
declaratory policy, to strengthen that relationship. 
I  A.l  THE RISE OF ClllNA AND ITS GLOBAL AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
The rise of China represents enormous opportunities and challenges to the international system. 
The question  i·s  how  China can share  in  the  responsibilities  and  opportunities  suited  to  its 
rapidly increasing power.  China's political importance makes its stability of great concern both 
to  its  neighbours and to  the world community at large.  We believe that lhis stability is  best 
served by political, economic and social reform in line with international norms. 
The mere  size of China, in  terms of land and population,  makes  it  impossible to  address  the 
central global issues of the 1990s without particular reference to the impact of China on their 
evolution and management.  China is not only a nuclear power and a permanent member of the 
UN  Security Council, but  also one of the world's biggest arms producers and  exporters.  Her 
role across lhe whole security spectrum is central to global, as well as regional security. 
Most  observers.  including  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank,  now  believe  that  on  the  basis  of 
purchasing power parities. the Chinese economy is  similar in size to Japan and second only to 
the  USA.  Extrapolations of recent growth rates  have led to  forecasts of Cl1ina  becoming the 
biggest  world  economy  in  a  generation's  time.  Although  these  estimates  arc  subject  to 
enormous margins of error. it  is  beyond dispute that alter 15  years of economic reform. China's 
economy has already become one of the  largest in the world.  1 b China's  size  makes  its  impact  on  the  physical  environment unique.  Despite  its  one-child 
policy,  Clli~a·s population increases by around  15  million people every year.  But  in addition, 
Cllina's energy consumption is already second only to that of the USA.  The consequences for 
the environment of such a huge country reaching western levels of consumption, and pollution, 
in the future are impossible to ignore.  Hence the importance of Cllina playing a full  part in the 
wider policy exchange on such key issues as the environment, population, or health. 
Although  in  the  long  term,  the  continued  growth  of  China's  economy  could  provide 
employment to its entire population, there is undoubtedly a short to medium term problem due 
to  the  substantial  number  of Chinese seeking to  enligrate.  With the possibilities  for  legal 
imnligration  to  Western  countries  linlited;  trafficking  of illegal  imnligrants  has  become 
increasingly prevalent.  This not only affects North America; traffickers have also set up routed 
through Central America and the former Soviet Union towards Europe.  It will be necessary to 
address the very real resultant problems in close cooperation with China. 
China's size is also reflected in the multiplicity of players (central government agencies, both in 
Beijing and elsewhere, provincial and municipal authorities, emerging econonlic actors)  who 
can influence Chinese policy and practice.  In many respects, for example, Chinese provinces 
represent differing markets  for  EU  exporters.  Moreover,  the rapid devolution of econonlic 
power is  shifting responsibility for econonlic and trade policy-making and  implementation to 
provincial  level.  This  makes  it  all  the more important  to  have  firm  comnlitments  on  the 
enforcement of China's international commitments at sub-national level,  for  example, during 
the wro negotiations.  It also makes it crucial to expand our bilateral trade and cooperation 
discussions to include provincial and local authorities which, de jure or de facto, are in charge 
of  economic and ~ade  policy in many fields. 
I  A.2  CHINA'S IMPORTANCE FOR EUROPE 
To update EU policy towards China and better coordinate EU  relations with this country, the 
European interests at stake must be clearly understood. 
Shared global and regional security interests which will  benefit from  co-operative and 
responsible  Chinese  policy  on  all  fronts,  including  adherence  to  the  treaties  governing 
nuclear and other weapons proliferation, an international drive to contain  arms sales and 
encouragement of Chinese domestic political, economic and social reform  in  the interests 
of its people (20%  of all  people alive on the globe today).  It is in everybody's interest -
including that of China itself- to see China demonstrating a cooperative and  responsible 
attitude  in  the  international  community,  whether  as  a  signatory  to  UN  Human  Rights 
instruments  and  the  Non-Proliferation Treaty,  or  by  beconling  a  WTO  Member  and  an 
active promoter of the  post-Rio Summit environmental agenda at  the  heart .of government 
policy. 
Shared interests on  other global  issues:  China should  be engaged  in  dialogue  and  co-
operation towards sustainable development and for  the protection of the environment and 
global  resources,  scientitic  and  technological  development,  the  information  society, 
demographic  growth.  poverty  alleviation,  the  preservation  of  forests,  addressing  the 
problem of illegal immigration, and the control and eradication of disease, AIDS, drugs and 
2 crime. 
Global  ~conomic stability: Ch.ina's  size and influence on world trade gives its economic 
policy global signiticance.  It is  in the world's interest, as well as China's. that the Chinese 
economy continues to grow and to open up, and that Ch.ina takes its place as a major player 
in  the  world system of economic rules  and policies:  It is also essential to  help China to 
participate fully in the rules-based system of  the World Trade Organisation. 
Competitiveness: in order for  European industry to  be  globally competitive we  must  be 
present  on the  world's  most dynamic  markets.  China is  now  the  Union's  fourth  largest 
market and fourth largest supplier. China's market could become the largest in the world in 
many high tech sectors, from telecommunications to aircraft and from computers to energy. 
An  active role for EU  business in China, where US  and Japanese competition is  already 
tierce, is essential. 
Given the breadth of these interests and the key role played by China, Europe must set itself the 
overriding  general  objective  of promoting  the  fullest  possible Chinese  involvement in  the 
international arena, whether on security, political, environmental, social or economic issues. 
We must also increase mutual understanding between Europeans and Chinese and raise the EU 
profile in Ch-ina. 
In  addition, the influence of China's domestic evolution on its international policies cannot be 
ignored. EU interests will therefore be well served by supporting the development in China of 
institutions and a civil society based on the rule of law. 
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[ B.l  CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT 
Ch.ina's own policy of a gradual opening up over recent years has been illustrated by  its desire 
to join or rejoin international organisations and to intensify links with other key partners such 
as the United States and Japan. China now wishes to play the full part on the world stage that is 
appropriate for a country of its importance. 
The EU  is eager to see Ch.ina sharing in the opportunities and responsibilities at the heart of the 
international community as China opens up to a freer flow of ideas and cooperation, both in  the 
key  Asian  region  and  globally.  We  support  the  wholehearted  participation  of China  in  the 
international community.  As  the Commission stated in last year's review of European policy 
towards the region, we have an interest in a stable and peaceful Asia.  Ch.ina's decisions on how 
to employ its economic  and military weight will have an essential impact on this. 
Without exaggerating the  role that the EU  can play, we  must use  the  opportunity offered  by 
participation  in  regional  fora  and  by  bilateral  dialogue  to  promote  a  responsible  and 
constructive Chinese  role  in  the  region,  including  issues  such  as  nuclear  weapons  on  the 
Korean peninsular and territorial differences such as the Spratleys.  As  we  recalled  in  March 1995, the EU  believes in the peaceful and negotiated handling of such problems, whether in the 
South China Sea or elsewhere. 
It is  in the interests of Europe, and of the international community as a whole. to engage China 
in  a political dialogue on disarmament and arms control issues. Nuclear Non-Proliferation, the 
missile technology control regime, the non-proliferation of chemical  and  biological  weapons, 
conventional  weapon sales, and control of trade in dual-use goods, should all  be  embraced in 
such a dialogue. 
An  ambitious  new  framework  for  bilateral  political  dialogue  was  set up  in  June  1994  to 
encourage  this  mutual  goal  of full  Chinese participation in  global affairs.  Regular  meetings 
between  the  EU  Troika  and  China  at  ministerial  level,  as  well  as  high  level  political 
consultations  between  the  Commission  and  China,  will  continue.  But  these  will  now  be 
supplemented by ad hoc Foreign Ministers' meetings, and twice yearly meetings, both between 
the  Chinese  Foreign  Minister  and  the  EU  ambassadors  in  Beijing,  and  between  the  EU. 
Presidency's  Foreign  Minister  and  the  Chinese  Ambassador  in  the  EU  Presidency  capital. 
There will  also be regular meetings of senior  officials responsible for a range of policy areas. 
This dialogue should develop to include all issues of  common interest and global significance. 
By the same token, with the ban of contacts between military personnel now lifted, the political 
and economic influence of the People's Liberation Army  makes it appropriate to  include the 
People's Liberation Army among potential dialogue partners.  · 
These new arrangements have already made possible a sustained exchange of views, not only 
on respective internal developments, but on global and regional  security interests, as  well  as 
human  rights.  All  such matters  can be  examined  in  depth whilst continuing to  respect the 
sovereignty  of both parties.  China and  the EU can now discuss mutual  interests  and  find 
common ground on the full range of  political and security issues. 
Collaboration should also be stepped.up in dealing with the migratory consequences of a more 
open Chinese economy:  in  this  respect,  the EU and China should work together  in  fighting 
illegal immigration, taking into account existing principles and practices of readmission. 
The EU  welcomes opportunities to develop such a dialogue in a regional context. Links with 
the ASEAN Regional Forum are already weli-esta.blished, and the Euro-Asia meeting in spring 
next year will provide an excellent opportunity for the EU and China to discuss mutual interests 
in the region. 
1  8.2  HUMAN RIGHTS 
A  commitment to  human rights and fundamental freedoms is  at  the heart of EU  policy 
worldwide.  Violations are not only a cause for concern in their own right, but because the  EU 
believes  that  espousal of international  standards of human rights and acceptance of political 
liberalisation is  vital  for  long-term social and political stability.  The key criterion for pursuing 
human rights initiatives must be effectiveness, the impact that an initiative would have on  the 
ground.  For  this  reason,  there  is  a  danger  that  relying  solely  on  frequent  and  strident 
declarations  will  dilute  the  message  or  lead  to  knee-jerk  reactions  from  the  Chinese 
government.  To make  progress,  all  the  EU  institutions should  pursue  human  rights  issues 
through  a  combination  of carefully  timed  public  statements,  formal  private discussions  and 
4 practical cooperation. 
The  EU  will  pursue the  issue  of human rights  through action on three  levels.  First,  it  will 
support potential efforts in China to open up and liberalise all areas of Chinese life, in different 
sections of society as  well as  different parts of the economy.  These trends inevitably reinforce 
moves  towards  the  development of a civil  society based on the  rule  of law.  Second,  it  will 
systematically  and regularly  continue to raise  human rights  issues  in bilateral dialogue  with 
China.  Third, it will engage the international community in the dialogue through multilateral 
fora  such as the United Nations.  The framework for all these activities is clearly delineated by 
the common acceptance by  both the EU and China of the Declaration and the Programme of 
Action of the World Conference on Human Rights of Vienna in June 19931. 
There are already signs that the increasing exposure of all  areas of Chinese life to the outside 
world  is  having  a  deep  - if gradual  - impact  through  social  change  and  increased  mutual 
understanding.  EU  policy  is  based on the well-founded belief that human rights  tend to  be 
better understood and better protected in societies open to the free  flow  of trade,  investment, 
people, and ideas.  As China continues its policy of opening up to the world, the EU  will work 
to  strengthen and encourage tllis trend.  This is  a major reason why the EU  will  continue to 
support the active participation of China in the international community in all  fields of policy, 
political and econonlic, and to  welcome China's increasing openness to dialogue.  It  is  also an 
important reason for  using  the  EC  cooperation programme to  encourage China's own efforts 
towards opening up, socially and economically. 
The  World  Conference on  Women  in Beijing in September  1995  has  focused  attention  on 
Cllina as  host, and Chinese policy in tllis  area will inevitably come under particular scrutiny. 
The EU  hopes  for  a successful outcome to the Conference, and looks forward to  supporting 
Cllina's efforts to build on the Conference in the years to come.  In tllis context, the follow-up to 
the  World  Conference  on  Social  Development,  in  Copenhagen  in  March  1995,  should  be 
mentioned. Such efforts to  internationalise Cllina are wholly consistent with a strong position 
on human rights - indeed they  must be part of it and  at  the heart of a long-term strategy of 
engagement. 
The EU  institutions have consistently demonstrated their commitment to giving a clear message 
to  Cllina on human rights.  In  February  1995,  the EU  proposed a  resolution before  the  UN 
Commission on Human  Right~, summarising  and deploring  the  violations  which  are  still  an 
everyday part of life in China.  The resolution acknowledged the steps taken by China to reduce 
poverty and to reform the legal system.  But reports of human rights violations by authorities at 
every level continue, with severe restrictions on the right of citizens to freedom of association, 
expression, and religion, as well as to due legal process and fair trial. China does not yet enjoy 
a  fully  impartial  administration of justice  and  respect  for  the  rule  of law.  Arrests  of pro-
democratic Chinese dissidents continue.  With more than 50 nlinority groups in China, notably 
in the Autonomous Region of Tibet but also elsewhere, respect for the distinct cuitural, etlmic, 
linguistic and religious identity of minorities also remains wholly inadequate. 
The  importance  attached  to  human  rights  has  been  a  consistent  feature  of the  EU's  policy 
towards China.  Immediately after the Tiananmen Square events in June 1989, the EU  imposed 
a number of sanctions which  have been only gradually relaxed (a ban of arms sales is  still in 
place).  The  Parliament has  passed  a  number  of resolutions  on China and  senior  European 
Ministers  and  Commissioners  consistently  raise human rights  when they  meet  tl1eir  Chinese 
As  incorporated in the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
5 opposite  numbers.  In  order to  achieve maximum effectiveness,  public statements  have  been 
reinforced by detailed discussions in private. 
The EU  must  pursue a detailed dialogue on all  aspects of human rights at  every opportunity. 
The new  and  more  systematic  arrangements  for  political  dialogue provide  regular  fora  for 
exchanging  views  and  deeperung  understanding  on human  rights  issues.  At  the  same  time, 
effective concertation in the human rights debate at the international level is  a prerequisite for 
a  successful  policy.  The  EU  puts  particular  stress  on  the  involvement of the  international 
commurtity through the  UN  Commission on Human Rights. The level of international support 
attracted for  the resolution criticising the situation in China in February 1995 suggests that this 
approach is  bearing fruit. 
On top of all  this,  a new  dialogue specifically devoted on human rights has recently  been 
launched at  China's suggestion. This dialogue centres on a  biannual meeting between the  EU 
troika and the Chinese government, which will  not only improve the flow  of information, but· 
will also provide an opporturtity for detailed discussion leading to concrete action. 
Practical action is essential if this government-to-government dialogue is  to be  fully  effective. 
The EU can promote practical cooperation, such as trairting and techrtical assistance in the legal 
and judicial fields, to back the efforts being made in China to establish a civil society based on 
the  rule  of law.  Up  till  now,  concrete  action  by  the  EU  to  encourage  cooperation  with 
individuals in the legal and judicial systems has been small-scale.  The EU should henceforth 
coordinate  with  the  Member  States  and  the  many  active  European  NGOs  to  support  the 
development of the rule of law in China. 
I  B.3  HONG KONG AND MACAU 
The  historical  ties  between  Europe  and  Hong  Kong  and  Macau  inevitably  mean  that  the 
European  Urtion  has  taken  a  particular  interest  in  the  arrangements  for  the  transfer  of 
sovereignty to China. 
The  Council  of Mirtisters  has  made  clear  the  importance  of implementing  the  principles 
contained formally in the two Joint Declarations signed by China and the Urtited Kingdom and 
Portugal respectively.  The  high  degree  of  autonomy  guaranteed  to  the  two  Special 
Admirtistrative Regions under the Declarations is of great importance to the well-being of the 
two  Regions,  and  is  recogrtised  in  Beijing  to  be  in  the  interests  of  China.  The  Joint 
Declarations  acknowledge  that  Hong  Kong  and  Macau each have  distinctive  characteristics 
which need to be respected. Both territories already run their own affairs in economic and trade 
policy.  The principle of continuity will govern the EU's relations with Hong  Kong and Macau 
in the years leading up to the transfer of sovereignty and beyond. 
Continued close  relations  with  the  EU  are  essential  to  both  Hong  Kong  and  Macau,  and  to 
Europe.  Hong  Kong  is  the  EU's eleventh largest trading partner.  Five of the  Member States 
enjoy bilateral  trade with  Hong  Kong  of over 2  billion  ECU.  It  is  also a  key  destination  for 
investment from across the  EU  Member States, with 40 EU  banks and 45  insurance companies 
licensed in  Hong Kong.  Some 40,000 EU citizens are resident in  Hong Kong. 
The Commission's Office in  Hong  Kong  responsible for relations with Hong  Kong  and  Macau 
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-~-------opened in  1993. and China has agreed that it will  continue to operate as  an  independent entity 
after transfer of sovereignty.  Equally, there will  be  no change in the  functioning of the  1992 
Trade and C9operation Agreement with Macau.  Relations in the WTO will continue, as  Hong 
Kong  and Macau both participate autonomously.  Cooperation is already developing bilaterally 
on customs, standards,  culture, university and business links.  But the EU will also seek to take 
advantage of the particular opportunities offered by closer relations in the years to come: 
both territories have important roles to play as  gateways to other regions of China, and 
can act as key facilitators for increased European trade and investment with China; 
the traditions of free trade and internationalism established by Hong  Kong  and Macau. 
These traditions serve as  important examples for China and in the region as  a whole, and 
suggest a continuing role for the territories as partners for the EU as the new WTO dialogue 
develops in the years to come. 
I  8.4  PROPOSALS 
The  European  Union  and  China  are  both  major  global  players.  They  should  sustain  a 
comprehensive,  long-term  bilateral  dialogue.  The  EU's  particular  goals  should  include  the 
following: 
to promote a dialogue on regional and global security issues which encourages full Chinese 
engagement in  the  international community through accession to all  the key  international 
instruments governing non-proliferation and arms control; 
to  give  practical  support  for  the  trend  towards creating a  reformed public  management 
system in China based on civil society and the rule of law; 
to develop a programme of effective and coordinated cooperation in the legal and judicial 
fields; 
to support the principles of the Joint Declarations governing the transfer of sovereignty of 
Hong Kong and Macau. 
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The economic reform process launched by_ Dcng Xiaoping sixteen years ago has dramatically 
changed the economic and  social  landscape  in  China.  Despite  its  incremental  nature  it  has 
exceeded all initial expectations. 
It is  in Europe's interests that this trend is  accepted as  irreversible.  Although different opinions 
are  still  voiced  in  Beijing  on  the  pace  of reform,  as  well  as  on  speci f1c  measures,  there  is 
widespread consensus among China's senior leaders about the necessity to deepen and broaden 
reforms  to  achieve  the  objective,  enshrined  in  China's  Constitution, of creating  a  "Socialist Market Economy" by the turn of the century (sec Annex 1  ).  11lis process has  accelerated since 
1992  to  reach  new  areas,  from  banking  and  taxation to  real  estate and  infrastructure.  New 
sectors -am:!: regions- have been opened to private, including foreign, activity.  However, China 
still falls well short of having a full  market economy, with adequate social protection including 
freedom of association for  employees.  Reform of state-owned industry, and the  creation of a 
social security system to cope with its  consequences, remain as  key challenges for  the  future. 
The establishment of an effective legal framework, properly enforced, is an essential element 
in the process. 
I  C.l  A BOOMING ECONOMY 
Reform has changed the structure of China's economy  beyond recognition.  Collective, 
private and  foreign-funded  companies  produce  and  sell  well  over half of China's  industriar  · 
goods.  Whilst over 80% of industrial output was subject to mandatory planning only ten years 
ago, the figure  is  now only  15%.  The same is  true for  price controls, which affect less  than 
10% of retail sales at present.  Public industry's share of total output has  fallen  from  77%  to 
44% and its  share of retail  sales to  an  even lower level.  Although these  figures  should be 
treated  cautibusly,  because  production  factor  markets  remain  more  controlled  than  goods 
markets in China, they clearly show a steady trend towards Iiberalisation of the economy. 
China's macroeconomic performance since the launching of reforms can only be described as 
remarkable.  GNP growth rates reached around 9% during the  1980s, and  12-13%  in the  last 
three years, with industrial output and investment growing at over 20% for several years. 
China's total  trade rose  from  20 $  billion to  237 $  billion between  1979 and 1994,  growing 
twice as fast as output.  Despite fluctuations, China's trade balance looks healthy and its foreign 
exchange reserves big enough to cope with a substantial foreign debt. 
A shadow is cast on this generally rosy picture by an accelerating inflation rate. The reasons for 
this are structural, due to an undeveloped monetary policy and expansive fiscal policy.  Other 
important structural imbalances exist which could undermine future development.  Traditional 
disparities  between  the  coastal  and  inland  areas  are  widening  rapidly,  leading  to  massive 
migrations, infrastructure bottlenecks and  environmental degradation.  The inevitable transfer 
of production from public industry to the private sector and the slowing down of the agriculture 
sector could lead to massive unemployment. 
The EU has much to offer to help China in its difficult process of transition.  An exchange of 
experience and information could support China's efforts towards reform, whilst also increasing 
European knowledge about the modern Chinese economy.  Training for economists has already 
been provided as  part of the EC-China cooperation programme: an economic dialogue in  areas 
such as monetary policy between officials could be the next step. 
Another  potential  area  for  fruitful  dialogue  is  social  policy.  An  exchange  would  help  to 
provide an important basis  to discuss the  evolution of social policy in  the  1990s and  beyond. 
Such a dialogue could  include the development of internationally recognised labour standards, 
including International Labour Organisation standards in areas such as child and prison labour. 
Another  important  element  is  the  involvement  of China  with  key  international  economic 
organisations  In the case of trade, this should mean WTO membership for  China (sec section C.3).  But the importance of China to the world economy should also be acknowledged by other 
organisations. The decision  by  the  May  1995  OECD Ministerial  meeting  to  promote a  new 
dialogue wiJh China is to be welcomed; Europe should consider how to  make a reality of these 
ties.  The  G-7  should also  consider  how  the  growing economic importance of.China can  be 
recognised in its deliberations. 
The dramatic changes in the Chinese economy have inevitably had a great impact on EU-China 
trade with total two-way trade exceeding 30 billion ECU in  1993  and reaching  an estimated 
35  billion ECU for 1994. 
EU-China trade has increased over fourteen-fold  since the beginning of reform in China (see 
Annex 2).  But EU exports have not kept pace with imports.  The EU's trade surplus of the mid 
1980s turned into a bilateral trade deficit, which has remained in the 8-10 billion ECU range in 
the  last  four  years.  However,  this  is  dwarfed  by  the  US  trade  deficit  with China and  the 
proportion of EU imports covered by exports (55%) is much higher than that of the US (26% in 
1993).  Moreover, the EUshare in the Chinese total impOrts grew from 11% to 15% in the first 
half of this  decade, a better export performance than that of the  US  in  the  Chinese market 
(rising slowly to 12%) but less than the Japanese one (22%).  Indeed, the EU  market share in 
China is higher than that enjoyed by the Union in other parts of the Asian region. 
The picture in the field of direct investment, one of the crucial elements in China's reforms, is 
less bright for Europe.  The EU share in total FDI in China (around 4%) remains far lower that 
its share in  other emerging markets. EU companies are lagging clearly behind not only Hong 
Kong and other overseas Chinese but also US and Japanese companies. 
EU  (15)  companies inves1.ed  a  total  of 2.5  $  billion in the  1979-1993  period (7  .3  $  billion 
pledged) in some 3,000 projects.  This represents less than half of the investment of either US 
or Japanese companies.  /Jthough the average size of EU projects tends to be bigger than that 
of its  competitors  and  some  of them  are  the  undisputed  leaders  in key  sectors  of China's 
industry (like automobiles, telecommunications, or pharmaceuticals) there is a clear perception, 
both within the Chinese, European and foreign business communities, that EU companies are 
being  less  dynamic  than  their  competitors  in  the  Chinese  market  - and  are  hence  missing 
opportunities.  This could not only have negative implications for future trade, but also weaken 
the EU's global competitiveness. 
It is,  of course,  up  to  each  company  to  evaluate  the  risks  and  rewards  of such  a  difficult 
undertaking  as  a Chinese  venture.  The long  term perspective  adopted  by  big  corporations, 
ready to incur shm1-term losses in order to gain a strategic presence, is usually not possible for 
SMEs.  Smaller firms  may  on the other hand be able to take advantage of opportunities with 
shorter  payback periods  and  narrower  initial  objectives  :  an  attractive  option  in  periods  of 
uncertainty.  The challenge for  Europe is  not  to find  the opportunities but simply to explore 
possible openings in China with as much energy as our main rivals. 
At the very  least, the  EU  should try  to  help EU  companies to  make well-informed investment 
decisions about the opportunities on offer in China by promoting better two-way information on 
investment conditions and opportunities, as well as direct business-to-business contacts. 
9 I  C.2  A UNIQUE ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
Information and contacts  will  not, however, in themselves be sufficient to resolve the problems 
faced by those seeking to trade with China  and make investments the(e. 
China has over the last years made enormous strides to liberalise its trade regime and open its 
economy to the world.  Tariffs have come down, trading rights have been granted to firms on a 
wider basis, the dual exchange rate has been unified, foreign investment has been attracted on a 
large scale, the basic framework for an effective judicial structure to handle property rights has 
been established. 
Although  these  measures  represent  important  steps  forward,  they  are  clearly  insufficient  to 
make the  Chinese trade system compatible  with  internationally  accepted rules.  The right ta 
import  and  export  goods  in  China  remains  largely  a  state  monopoly.  Customs  duties  are 
prohibitive, particularly for  many consumer products (and are applied in an  ad  hoc manner). 
Non-tariff measures such as licences and quotas abound.  Exports continue to enjoy numerous 
unfairly  favourable  conditions,  foreign  currency  controls  remain  a  major obstacle,  and  new 
technical barriers are introduced to frustrate imports. Transparency remains a big problem due 
to unpublished administrative rules and orders, and secret trade plans on some products. These 
are only some examples: Annex 3 provides a full summary. 
The EU's  efforts  to  increase  the  WTO-compatibility of trade  rules,  and  to  improve  market 
access and the investment environment in China, have focused on the multilateral negotiations 
for China's WTO membership and on bilateral trade meetings.  The objective is a coherent and 
consistent  one:  to  bring  about  the  application  of general  internationally  agreed  trade 
principles, and at the same  time to deal with specific issues of mutual concern. 
[ C.3  MEMBERSHIP OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 
As  a founder  member of the GATT and once more a major player on world markets,  China's 
membership of the  World Trade Organisation is  in  the  interest of all  trading  nations.  Since 
China's  application  to  return  to  the  GATT in July  1986,  the  EU  has  consistently sought to 
accelerate progress towards a decision on Chinese membership, ~ased on conditions which will 
guarantee both China's ability to meet the extensive requirements of WTO membership and the 
integrity of the WTO system. 
The EU has taken a leading role in the negotiation, in particular in establishing the principle 
that  of the  commitments  that  China  would  make  when  joining  the  WTO,  most  would  be 
implemented on  the  date of membership,  but  some could be  implemented under  multilateral 
surveillance over a specified period of time after entry into the WTO.  This general approach 
reflects  a  sympathetic  understanding  of  the  fact  that  China  is  a  country  that  is  rapidly 
developing, but.  in  important respects,  has  not  yet become a developed economy with  all  the 
characteristics of a fully-fledged market-economy system. 
Despite the  stand-off in  these  negotiations  in  late  1994, the  Commission continues to  believe 
that the structure of the deal  proposed by  the  European side  last year, and later carried further 
10 by  the Chairman of the  GAlT Working  Party on China,  remains  valid.  Both  China and  its 
trading partners must now show additional  political commitment to progress if a deal  is  to  be 
reached.  The  full  integration of China into the  WTO system is  in  the  interest of all  parties 
concerned: for  WTO Members it  would contribute to guaranteeing the continuation of China's 
reform process until a mature market economy is established, and for China it would guarantee 
that  its  goods  and  services have  open access  to  export  markets  around  the  world.  Although 
contacts have been re-launched in recent weeks, it remains to be seen whether substantive WTO 
negotiations can resume and a deal can soon be struck. 
In our view, the key remaining issues are: 
commitments in the field of import tariffs.  China should be ready to envisage binding its 
duties at levels which, at the end of an implementation period, would result in a weighted 
average tariff not higher than about twice the OECD average; 
initial commitments  in  the  field  of traded services across  all  sectors  under  negotiation. 
Commitments should not be undermined by geographical limitations, access specifications 
or other restrictions; 
the liberalisation of the foreign trade monopoly, if necessary with transitional provisions. 
An automatic right of individuals, both national and foreign; to engage in direct import or 
export trade in all products is a basic feature of the WTO system, but does not yet exist in 
China; 
adherence  by  China  to  the  Tokyo  Round  Civil  Aircraft  Code  and  the  Government 
Procurement Agreement.  Chinese implementation of the Procurement Agreement  will 
create opportunities abroad and cut government costs at home, and it could be implemented 
in stages; 
elimination by China of all WTO-inconsistent quotas or other non-tariff barriers, over a 
transitional period; 
making China's industrial policies WTO compatible; 
acceptance  of  appropriate  provisions  on  other  horizontal  issues  such  as  subsidies, 
standards, state-pricing, state trading and the elimination of export duties. 
the  detinition  of an  appropriate  transitional  trade  defence  mechanism,  which  could  be 
invoked in cases of market disruption. 
Beyond the requirements that aim to establish appropriate access to China's market as a balance 
for the effective access which Chinese exports and investments enjoy in  the  markets of WTO 
Members benefit. an essential precondition of any final deal must be firm Chinese adherence to 
the  principle  of non-discrimination.  11lis  will  be  a  precondition  for  EU  support  of any 
successful WTO package. 
The approach outlined above reflects the recognition of China's current transitional position in 
its suggested use of the technique of transitional periods.  But  it properly pays  regard to  the 
principle  that  there  are  some  principles  of  the  international  trade  order  which  are  so 
fundamental  that it  is  reasonable to expect their application by  countries participating in  that 
international trade order, whatever their stage of development. 
II I  C.4  BILATERAL TRADE DISCUSSIONS 
Bilateral  trade  talks  since  1992  have  had  three  interrelated  objectives:  promoting  Cl1ina's 
economic and trade  reforms,  helping China into the  multilateral trade system,  and  achieving 
?etter market access for European goods and services. 
This dialogue  was  institutionalised  in  1993  by  an  Economic and Trade Working Group. 
1994  saw  detailed,  sectoral  meetings  on  IPR,  Agriculture,  and  Financial  Services.  This 
process should continue, with the expansion of trade talks to other sectors and their extension 
through discussions with sectoral Ministries, as the only way to achieve concrete results.  One 
subject of possible  future  dialogue might be  competition matters, as  cooperation in  this  field 
will enhance the effectiveness of international trade. 
The main  results  (Annex  3)  so  far  have  been  solutions to specific issues,  from  trademark 
infringements to veterinary restrictions and other technical barriers.  Although many of the EU 
bilateral requests are already being discussed in the framework of the WTO accession process, 
it has also been useful to discuss bilaterally key EU concerns. 
A sustained trade dialogue has also enabled Europe to avoid any risk of discrimination and to 
ensure that EU economic operators enjoy the same treatment as their competitors in China 
This has been particularly important in areas where the US  and China have concluded bilateral 
agreements,  like  intellectual  property,  maritime transport,  and market access.  In  each case, 
including the February 1995 IPR deal, China has formally undertaken to ensure equal treatment 
for EU persons and entities. 
Bilateral discussions also give an opportunity to link trade issues and cooperation activities. 
For example,  the EU-China industrial  property technical  assistance programme followed  the 
signing of agreed minutes on IPR protection.  In  the case of IPR for example, the cooperation 
that is being provided may well prove essential in making it possible for China to apply on the 
ground the agreements that have been signed. 
I  c.s  PROPOSALS 
a)  The EU should continue to  strongly support reform as an integral part of its  trade 
and cooperation policies. 
b)  The Commission is  ready to  engage with Chinese authorities in  a dialogue on economic, 
social and monetary issues. 
c)  The  EU  should  encourage  dialogue  between  China  and  other  key  bodies  such  as  the 
OECD, and raise the profile of China in debate in the G-7. 
d)  The  EU  should pursue China's entry to the WTO as soon as  possible. under  the  right 
conditions, and monitor closely the implementation of China's WTO commitments. e)  In order to increase the effectiveness of our bilateral trade dialogue, the EU should: 
increase the frequency of the Economic and Trade Working Group meetings, 
consolidate the sectoral meetings in the three sectors, IPR, Agriculture and Financial 
Services, as permanent fora for in-depth discussions, 
expand these  meetings  to  new  sectors  or subjects  (like  technical  barriers  to  trade, 
consumer goods, in the transport sector, and on competition), 
develop contacts with sectoral ministries and provincial authorities, 
establish more links between trade and investment talks and cooperation activities (in 
sectors like standards and public procurement). 
t)  Direct investment in China is  bound to be crucial both for ensuring access to this market 
and for bolstering the global competitiveness of EU industry.  The EU therefore should to 
develop a new programme of business cooperation with China (see section 0.2). 
D.  COOPERATION 
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China is  a  vast  country,  and  the  EU  has  limited resources  for  cooperation.  W\J.en  China's 
importance is taken into account, the resources allocated to cooperation work with China have 
remained small.  Under the basic budget lines for development aid and economic cooperation in 
Asia,  under  20  million  ECU  was  set  aside  each year during  the  period  1991-1994.  This 
compares with some 90 million ECU for India, or 460 million ECU for the former Soviet Union 
countries under theTA  CIS programme in 1994. 
I  0.1  COOPERATION STRATEGY 
The following types of activity should be given priority: 
cooperation in areas of critical importance for the Chinese economy; 
cooperation which has a catalytic effect on best practice within the Chinese system; 
cooperation which bolsters reform. 
EC cooperation should both be reinforced and more closely targeted on support for reform in 
all areas of Chinese society: reform to promote the integration of China into the world trade and 
investment system, reform of the underdeveloped and restrictive civil society in China, reform 
to bring China closer into the global information society, and reform to prevent further damage 
to the physical environment in China.  The rural and urban poverty which remains a scourge for 
millions  of Chinese and  the  need  to  feed  such  a huge  population is  at  the  heart  of Chinese 
13 government policy, and underlies all EC cooperation. 
Effectivene~s and impact over the long term remain essential. 
There are three key targets for EC-China cooperation: 
The Chinese government is acutely aware of the deficiencies in the sldlls base in China and 
of the enormous need for further human resource development as Chinese society and the 
Chinese economy evolve.  This message is increasingly echoed by European entrepreneurs 
finding that their opportunities to expand in China are held back by the lack of appropriate 
sldlls in  China.  We  need  to  identify a coherent European contribution in education and 
training.  The EU should build on the China-Europe International Business School (CEIBS) 
in  Shanghai  to  bring the best of European expertise, including community experience in 
education and training policy-maldng and programme development, to China.  We need to 
identify  partners  in  other  provinces  for  initiatives  to promote  technical  and  vocational 
training, for which one option would be to follow the CEIBS format of a permanent centre 
to address  sldll  shortages  in fields  from engineering to  accountancy.  On the university 
front,  60,000  students  from  China  are  in  the  US  but  only  6,000  in Europe:  we  must 
redouble our efforts in higher education. 
Economic  and  social  reform  should  be  encouraged  through  a  more  wide  ranging 
programme of support to  reforms touching on individual Chinese in different professions 
and walks of life.  In particular the development of a fair and effectively worldng system 
for the  administration of justice should be assisted and encouraged, stepping up judicial 
cooperation between the  EU and its Member States on the one hand, and China on the 
other.  One approach worth exploring would be to establish a cooperativ~ programme in the 
legal and judicial field through an EU-wide exchange programme for young lawyers, judges 
and  finally  law  enforcement  officials.  This  would  require  careful  c~rdination among 
Member States actors, but would provide (following language training)  for  internships at 
European civil,  administrative  and perhaps  constitutional courts as  well  as  selected law 
firms.  A reciprocal  programme  for  Europeans could be attractive in  some  areas of the 
project. 
The facilitation of cooperation between private sector actors  by the EU and the Chinese 
government will support the healthy evolution of both economies.  This conviction is at the 
core  of a  developing  programme  of business  cooperation,  with  three  central  goals:  to 
support the general  ~volution of the business environment in China, to  develop new sldlls 
central to the management and administration of the modern Chinese economy, and to give 
direct  encouragement  to  closer  ties  between  EU  and  Chinese  enterprises,  through  the 
provision  of information  and  the  facilitation  of face-to-face  contacts.  Supporting  the 
development  of  industrial  cooperation  with  China  should  reinforce  the  presence  of 
European  operations in  China and encourage new  economic links.  These objectives are 
already central to several existing initiatives, but have not kept pace with the growth in EU 
economic interests and opportunities in China. 
These  objectives  can  be  pursued  across  a  range  of policy  areas.  Two  areas  of particular 
potential  for  future  development  arc  the  environment,  and  scientific  and  technological 
cooperation: 
The environmental challenge faced by a rapidly developing China has been recognised by 
the Chinese government in  its "Agenda 21"  follow-up programme to the  Rio Summit, with 
14 its  accompanying  list  of  specific  projects  leading  to  sustainable  development.  The 
problems faced by China in the environmental field are partly systemic - a low awareness 
of the l9ng-term consequences of inaction - partly technological, and partly that China does 
not  believe  that  it  can  afford  the  costs  of high  environmental  standard!).  Of critical 
importance is the need to integrate environmental considerations into other areas of policy, 
such as economic planning.  A new working group has been set up to discuss how the EU 
can best help Chinese efforts.  We need to identify a coherent European contribution in a 
field where there is multiplicity of signals from the Chinese side.  Our contribution must be 
defined  clearly  before  it  is  launched  and  must  make  best  use  of  EU  expertise  in 
environmental  policy-making  and  technology,  including  clean  energy  technology.  It is 
therefore essential that initiatives make full use of the willingness of European business to 
commit itself to a long-term technological partnership with China. 
Scientific  and  technological  cooperation  promotes  an  enabling  environment  for 
cooperation in general, as well as helping the search for science-based solutions to commofl 
global  problems.  S&T cooperation  with China should therefore  be pursued  under  the 
Community's Fourth Framework Programme so as to strengthen the European scientific and 
industrial  base  and  to  contribute  to  other  Community  cooperation  with  China.  S&T 
cooperation  should  mobilise  complementary  skills· from  across  Europe  and  China, 
supporting innovative research and promoting the development of human and institutional 
capital, with a particular emphasis on the training and mobility of young researchers. 
I  D.2  PROPOSALS 
The EC should step up its  cooperation programme and ensure that it fits  the economic and 
political realities of China in the 1990s. 
In  view of the  limited  resources  available,  it  also requires  a  clear choice of priorities  and 
concentration on them, rather than a dissipated efforts which would achieve less for China and 
render the EC's cooperation effort far less apparent within China., 
Current  financial  resources  are  not  sufficient  to  fulfil  all  these  objectives,  but  increasing 
budgetary resources is  not the only way to improve the effectiveness of EU  action in China. 
The size of China  makes  it  particularly  worthwhile to  ensure synergies  between  Member 
States and EU activities, as  well  as to concentrate resources. Cooperation should also  be 
central to the objective of raising the profile of the EU in China, and of China in the EU.  New 
cooperation work should have an information strategy as an explicit element for all major new 
projects (see section E.2). 
Opportunities for EC-China cooperation should be sought in the following areas: 
Support  for  human  resource development in  China should  follow  the  opening  of the 
China-Europe  International  Business  School  with  new  initiatives  at  different  levels, 
including:  a programme  to  build ties  and networks  between individual  higher  education 
institutions in China and the EU  and provide opportunities for Chinese students to benefit 
from  European  expertise,  and  a  new  programme  of technical  and  vocational  training 
targeted on the needs identified by economic operators in China. 
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in  sectors critical to  reform.  A second phase of the  IPR  training programme should shift 
the  emp~asis towards new areas such as copyrights and enforcement measures, and should 
be  followed  by  new  programmes  in  the  areas of quality  and  standardisation,  and  public 
procurement.  New cooperation should be  organised to promote the development of civil 
society  in  China,  and  in  pa1ticular  to  support  the  evolution  of the  legal  and  judicial 
professions with a view to strengthening the rule of law in China. 
Action should continue to address rural and urban poverty and agricultural productivity 
through encouragement to the development of local economies.  Initiatives need to  be  in 
tune with the needs of a rapidly changing China. 
EU  business and  technical expertise must be involved in a dialogue on the environment, 
with a transfer of EU expertise in environmental policy-making and technology relevant to 
Chinese circumstances in  key  sectors such as energy.  We should promote exchanges of. 
information on the environment between the Commission, the Member States and China; 
and  improve  communication  with  other  organisations  helping  China  to  improve  its 
environment. 
A new programme of business cooperation should bring together the commercial slant of 
much cooperation work and should be a key element in an intensified dialogue with the EU 
business community.  This should have two new elements: 
promoting a two-way flow of relevant commercial information and support to EU and 
Chinese businessmen, through the establishment of a network of Business Information 
Centres  in  China,  in provinces  of China where existing  business  ties  to China are 
scarce; 
facilitating  direct  business-to-business  contacts  in sectors of particular potential  for 
industrial  cooperation,  through  a  coordinated  programme  of collaboration  between 
enterprises and business to business trade or investment seminars, both in Europe and 
in China. 
Enhanced  forms  of scientific  and  technological  cooperation  under  the  Community's 
Fourth  Framework Programme should be  based  on a  continuing effort  to  promote  high 
quality research in key areas of cooperation with China. 
Projects which are not central to these objectives should be phased out or not renewed. 
IE.l  A POLICY APPROACH ADAPTED TO A CHANGING CHINA  l 
China is  embarked  on  a  period  of change.  Europe's  policies,  as  outlined  above,  can  both 
support  the  trend  to  reform  in  China  and  accommodate  any  uncertainties  about  the  future 
direction  of Chinese  (and  European)  domestic  policies.  The development  of the  EU-China 
16 relationship must be a sustained long-term goal. 
EU  policy  should  seek  to  promote  the  objectives  that  have  been  described  above  in  a 
comprehensive way, but should also be flexible enough to cope with unavoidable.uncertainties 
in the future development of China.  Most observers agree on the existence of a great variety of 
possible future economic, and  in  particular political, scenarios for  the decades to  come.  But 
whatever temporary ups and downs come in the wake of trade quarrels or political differences, 
EU policy should never lose sight of its strategic interests in China. 
The various programmes and instruments at the EU's disposal will always be small relative to a 
country of China's size.  At the same time, several Member States are very active in areas like 
training,  technical  assistance,  business  facilitation,  and  the  environment,  all  of which  are 
priorities in EU policy.  There is  much to be gained by pooling experience and, if appropriate, 
resources in designing and implementing these common activities.  If  we do not cooperate, 
our voice will not be heard. 
Several  Chinese provinces have  larger  populations than the largest  EU  Member States.  In 
addition,  recent  years  have  seen  the  proliferation  of  special  economic  zones  and  other 
development areas, as  well as  a devolution of economic power which has shifted responsibility 
for  economic  and  trade  policy-making  and  implementation  to  provincial  level.  Provincial 
authorities have wide powers across a variety of policy areas.  The institutional interlocutors for 
the  EU  will  always  be  the  ministries  in  Beijing.  But  it  is  important  for  EU  policy  to 
acknowledge  the importance  of  the  provinces  and  for  dialogue  on  some  economic  and 
cooperation issues to reach the provincial level: 
The "Asia strategy" Communication called for a higher profile for the European Union in 
Asia.  Given China's strong cultural identity and language, and given the shortcomings of its 
communication system and its sheer size, China presents a particular challenge. 
The most important factor in the EU's image is our policy towards China.  The deeper political 
dialogue now launched must be used to put a greater stress on the long-term common interests 
of the  EU  and China.  The EU  and  China should gradually become more  used  to  working 
together on a variety of policy issues  and to debating key areas of mutual interest.  A closer 
economic  partnership  will  help  to  further  the  interests  of  Europe  and  China,  already 
increasingly intertwined.  Closer and better-focused cooperation will bring the work of the EU 
to  a  broader cross-section of society.  But  a  more  active  information  policy  in  China is 
essential to create a stronger profile for the EU. 
In addition, the EU's activities in China too often go unnoticed in Europe, with many who might 
make a positive contribution or become more closely involved unaware of the opportunities.  If 
a deeper partnership is to develop between Europeans and Chinese, openness and interest must 
be  fostered on both sides.  Informing the European public of the EU's  activities  should be 
seen as an inherent part of the Commission's responsibility to implement policy. 
I  E.2  PROPOSALS 
The impact of EU  policy should be  maximised by better coordination.  This could be ach.ieved 
by  improving the  links  between the  Member States, the  Commission, and  the  private sector, 
17 both in Europe and in China: 
A Chin'! Experts Group (along the lines of t11e  existing ones for Japan and  Korea) could 
act  as  a  forum  for  t11e  exchange of ideas  and  information about China between experts 
from  Member States' administrations and the Commission, across all  policy areas. 
The  possibility  of closer  coordination  of cooperation  activities  in  China  with  the 
Member  States  and  other  international  organisations  should  also  be  explored  more 
thoroughly.  Co-financing could bring  benefits  in  pooling experience and  strengt11s  (the 
Commission  only  manages  some  8%  of total  EU  assistance  to  China,  but  offers  grant 
financing rather t11an soft loans).  A co-financing facility could be introduced to set aside a 
proportion of resources  each year  for  joint projects  with the  Member States.  Bringing 
together initiatives such as  business service centres or cultural centres in  one place could 
also  help  to consolidate  the  EU  presence  in  China;  "Europa Houses"  in  big  provincial 
cities could house a number of different activities. 
An EU Business Council in Beijing, giving voice to EU businesses in  China and taking 
advantage of existing networks bot11  in China and in Europe, would help to articulate t11e 
views of the  European business community and could act as an important input to  policy 
formulation. 
Business,  Commission  and  Member  States  should  also  be  brought  together  in  sectoral 
committees, to help effective monitoring not only of respect of China's WTO commitments 
but, more generally, of China's new commercial legislation. 
Business could also  be  more  closely involved in  sponsorship of EU-funded cooperation 
projects (as  is already  t11e  case  wit11  the China-Europe International  Business School  in 
Shanghai).  Certainly t11e  close association of EU industry in cooperation is essential, not 
only to  help target real  industrial  needs  but  also  to  ensure the strong  link  between EU 
initiatives and business which will keep such cooperation in tune with economic realities. 
An information strategy for China could include a variety of initiatives to build up awareness 
of the EU  in  the media and amongst opinion-formers in  China, and to foster awareness of EU 
initiatives amongst the wider European public: 
Better  targeted  information  products and  intensified  press  and  information  actiVIties. 
One way to reach an  influential audience in bot11  Europe and China would be to publish a 
professionally edited  regular journal,  like  those  already  issued  in  the  United States and 
Russia.  Anomer,  which  requires  a careful  feasibility  study,  is  t11e  creation of European 
inputs  to  the  growing  Chinese  electronic  information  society.  There  should  also  be  a 
greater infor"mation component in cooperation work. 
Better  collaboration  with  Memher States' cultural activities in  China.  The  Council 
could invite Member States to include where possible a European element in their cultural 
initiatives in China. 
Expansion of the  current  EU visitors programme, under which the Commission invites 
media  representatives  and  opinion-formers  to  Brussels  and  at  least  two  Member States, 
Better networking of those involved in cooperation work. 
Encouragement of the development of European Studies in China as part of the proposed 
18 programme of university cooperation (see section 0.2), to build a better picture of the EU 
in  China over  the  long  term.  Support  to  promote  knowledge  about  China  in  Europe, 
through.  the development of research  and  networks  between  those engaged  on  Chinese 
studies in  Europe.  We  also  need  to  review the usefulness of European [)ocumentation 
Centres in China. 
China is  embarked on  a  period  of change.  Europe's  policies,  as  outlined  above,  can  both 
support the trend to reform in China and accommodate any uncertainties about the future.  The 
development of the EU-China relationship must be a sustained long-term goal. 
The rise of China presents China and the world with new challenges and opportunities.  It is in 
Europe's interest that the current process of economic and social  reform  be  encouraged and 
sustained.  Europe and China need a long-term bilateral relationship in order to secure shared 
goals.  Some such goals - such as the mutual interest in a smooth transition for Hong Kong and 
Macau - are based on ties of long  standing.  Others reflect new  interests.  But in  both cases, 
Europe and China can work together in many practical ways: progress towards full  integration 
in the world market economy, strengthening of civil society, poverty alleviation, environment 
protection,  human  resource  development,  scientific  and  technological  development,  the 
information society,  trade and investment cooperation. 
The Council is invited to: 
adopt the approach set out in this Communication; 
to encourage China to become fully integrated in the international community 
widening political dialogue to include all issues of common interest and global 
significance 
supporting  China's  WTO  membership  on the  basis  of clear  commitments  to 
create a fully-fledged market economy; 
to contribute to reform inside China 
pursuing EU  concerns on human rights  and promoting  the  development of a 
civil society in China through support to the opening up of China, public and 
private bilateral ties, and international dialogue in multilateral fora 
using  cooperation  to  pursue  the  goals  of human  resource  development,  the 
promotion of economic and social  reform, and cooperation between economic 
actors,  including  action  in  the  field  of  the  environment  and  science  and 
technology; 
to intensify ties between the European Union and China 
developing commercial  contacts  to  improve the  business environment  for  EU 
business in Chi.na and to increase market access on a non-discriminatory basis 
encouraging contact between Europeans and Chinese, with a particular stress on 
business cooperation; 
19 TI1e Council is invited to endorse the strategy outlined in this communication, and to invite the 
Commission, Member States, business and other actors to cooperate in pursuing the approach 
outlined.  TI1e Commission intends to move forward with the initiatives outlined in the months 
ahead. 
20 Following the 1hird Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's Eleventh Congress in  December 
1978,  Deng  Xiaoping  led  China  on  an  ambitious  reform  process  which  has  substantially 
changed the Chinese economic system as  well as  its  relations with the  world economy.  1his 
process has t>een neither smooth and steady nor the result of a clearly defined plan from above. 
On the contrary, it has been driven by a multitude of initiatives at  various levels (central, local, 
individual), largely on a trial and error basis, and has  resulted in  an uneven path with several 
switches  in  focus  and  emphasis.  Nevertheless,  reforms  have  undoubtedly  brought  about  a 
dramatic economic revitalisation and improved living standards. 
Over the 16 years of this process, different phases can be identified: 
a)  Launching of Reforms  and emphasis on  Agriculture  (December  1978  - September 
1984):  as  seems  logical  in  a  country  with  some  800  million  people  living  in  the 
countryside, the first phase of reform focused on agriculture.  The key mea<;ures  included 
the raising of the prices paid by the state for farm goods and the introduction of a Contract 
Production  Responsibility  System,  which · replaced  people's  communes  with  the 
encouragement of individual  productivity.  In contrast, urban reform was  only  tentative. 
Perhaps the most significant step was the creation of Special Economic Zones  to  boost 
foreign investment in four coastal areas. 
b)  Efforts towards creating a  market economy (October  1984  - September  1988):  this 
phase  tried  to  tackle  the  reform  of state  enterprises  and  price  liberalisation,  two  key 
requirements  for  change.  The  objective  was  to  separate  ownership  (public)  and 
management through new  legislation in areas like  bankruptcy, and experiments in  share 
holding and financial  markets.  In the area of price deregulation, progress was  made for 
most consumer goods. 
c)  Retrenchment (October  1988-December 1991):  this  phase saw the Chinese  authorities 
trying to regain control of an overheated economy by freezing prices, stopping reforms and 
slashing investment.  But it appeared increasingly clear during this period that a decade of 
reform  has  substantially  reduced  the  government's  ability  to  control  economic  actors. 
However,  reform was continued in areas such as prices and trade. 
d)  Re-launching at higher speed (since January 1992): the present phase, launched by Deng 
Xiaoping's  trip  to  the  South in  January  1992,  has  drastically  altered  the  political  and 
economic climate, with a generalised rush towards accelerated reform in all  areas of the 
economy,  including  areas  like  services or land  use  rights,  previously  little  affected  by 
reforms.  Furthermore,  new  inland  and  Yangtze  areas  (like  Nanjing,  Wuhan  and 
Chongqing)  have  opened  for  foreign  trade  and  investment.  New  measures  have  been 
announced in the key  areas of enterprise management ami  price liberalisation.  The  new 
Company Law entered into force in 1994.  The reform of the banking system was launched 
and the new taxation system, including a VAT and a modified sharing of fiscal  resources 
between Beijing and the provinces, were both enacted in  1994.  The decision to abolish tile 
official exchange rate and to allow the unified exchange rate to f1oat (though controlled) in 
the swap markets, and  the  new  taxation system, arc  the  most recent and crucial  reforms. 
Attempts  to  impose  a  credit  squeeze  had  some  effect  during  1994,  but  the  economy's 
momentum and growing provincial autonomy ensured that such attempt<;  by  the centre to 
slow the economy had only limited effect.  Such reforms have been enshrined in  China's 
Constitution under the new  formula of socialist m;u-kct economy. 
].I Macroeconomic Performance 
Since  the  launching  of reforms,  China  has  enjoyed  a  clear  acceleration  of GOP growth, 
averaging around 9%  per year during the  1980s.  Both industry and  agriculture showed faster 
growth than in the past.  Although output grew more rapidly in industry ( 12.6% annually during 
the 1980s) and especially in manufacturing, the acceleration in output growth was also dramatic 
in the  agric~lture sector.  However, fast growth was accompanied by growing inflation.  China 
had  a  long  tradition  of  almost  no  inflation,  but  this  trend  changed  abruptly  with  the 
liberalisation of production and prices, reaching a peak of over 18% in 1989.  · 
Chinese economic  performance since  1992  can only  be described as  remarkable. GNP 
growth reached  12.8%, 13.4% and  11.8% in the last three years,  with industrial output up by 
13%,  20% and 21% respectively.  Fixed investment surged by 29% last year.  But inflation at 
around 25% in  1994, up from 15% in 1993, has aroused the traditional fears of overheating. 
Another spectacular result of Chinese reforms has  been the  rapid growth of foreign  trade. 
Since 1979 Chinese trade grew twice as fast  as  output, a clear outcome of China's new open-
door policy.  At the beginning of the reform period in 1978, total Chinese trade amounted to 20 
$billion and was roughly balanced. By 1994 this had surged to 237 $billion. In addition, after 
trade deficits which reached as high as  15  $ billion in 1985, the Chinese trade balance went 
back to a surplus position in 1990.  With the exception of a 12 $billion deficit in 1993, China 
has enjoyed surpluses ever since, bolstered by what amounted to a devaluation of the Yuan at 
the time of currency unification in January 1994.  This good performance in trade has helped to 
ease the foreign debt burden, which started to worry Chinese policy-makers during the 1980s, 
but now China has  a very healthy foreign-exchange  reserves at around 50 $ billion, even if 
foreign debt remains substantial at 80 $ billion. 
Structural Problems 
However, economic reform  and  booming trade has been concentrated in only a few  Chinese 
provinces.  With some exceptions, traditional regional imbalances in China between the rich 
and dynamic Southeast coastal areas (from Shanghai down to Canton) and the more backward 
North  and  West  inland  areas  have  been  compounded  since the  beginning  of reform.  The 
establishment  of five  Special  Economic  Zones  (Shenzhen,  Zhuhai,  Shantou,  Xiamen  and 
Hainan) followed by the ".:lpening" to foreign investment of 14 coastal cities and the creation of 
Free Trade Zones and 5 Open Economic Zones accentuated the gap between the "two Chinas". 
The whole coast from  North to South has progressively become an open zone that includes 11 
provinces  (292  cities  and  districts)  which  represent  less  than  5%  of Chinese  territory  and 
around 17% of population, but which produce one third of  China's GNP. 
Other structural problems, like infrastructure bottlenecks and environmental degradation, 
risk undermining  sustainable long  term economic growth in China.  The problems  of acute 
energy shortages, a transport system which is  clearly inefficient and unable to  meet demand, 
and primitive telecommunications, are bound to get worse as economic growth gathers speed 
and  investment in these  key  sectors lags  far  behind.  Environmental deterioration is  already 
serious and, despite the  government's awareness of the dangers of long-term damage, China's 
economic development strategy has  focused on rapid wealth creation, leaving the consequences 
to be dealt with in the future. 
Traditionally, Cll.ina watchers used to focus on inflation as the most obvious signal not only of 
economic difficulties but also of political trouble ahead (and 1989 certainly proved them right). 
Recent figures have again pointed to overheating of the economy and growing urban inflation. 
Monetary policy rests on administered credit and not on interest rates or an open market policy. 
The recent negative interest rates make overheating a risk. Fiscal policy, and the protection of 
loss-making state owned enterprises, are also typically inflationary.  A growing budget deficit 
(over 8%  of GOP) and a rapidly expanding money supply are likely to exacerbate the problem . 
.  n. ---------------------------------------------
Unemployment could become a much more serious long-term problem, especially if reform of 
U1e  inefficient state-owned sector gathers pace.  Already, migration on a huge scale has  taken 
place from  the poor West to the coastal cities -some estimates have  put this  as  high as  100 
million people. 
The making of a "Socialist  Market Economy" with Chinese characteristics 
The effects of over one decade of reform can be  analysed in terms of the degree to which the 
market economy has developed in China, both as a way of organising production and as a way 
of matching supply and demand. In other words, what proportion of Chinese output is the result 
·of mandatory planning (instead of individual decisions by companies) and what proportion of 
Chinese prices  is  controlled (instead of freely  set by  market forces).  Evolution  in  company 
ownership is another key factor in assessing progress in reform. 
a)  Planning versus market in output and prices: the share of individual output which was 
the object of mandatory planning has been reduced sharply from around 80% in the early 
1980s  to just  17%  in  1991.  In  other words,  from  an economy  in  which only  20%  of 
industrial production escaped mandatory output targets, China moved to a new situation in 
which  less  than  20%  of this  output  was  under  the  strict  control  of the  plan.  Recent. 
liberalisation has further reduced state production quotas.  The hand of the state is still felt 
in China in numerous ways;, but the crude influence of planning has been largely swept 
aside.  The same trend towards liberalisation is  noticeable in price determination. Some 
estimates indicate that the share of products under controlled prices has been reduced to 
22%  for agriculture, 20%  for consumer goods and 36% for  means of production.  A new 
wave of liberalisation, announced during 1993, left only less than 10% of retail sales under 
state pricing. 
b)  Ownership: diversification in the ownership of production units, especially the growth of 
the  non-state sector, is  a clear indication of the  development of a  market economy.  In 
1978, 77.6% of industrial  output and 54.6% of retail sales  were  in the  hands  of state 
companies. 1994 estimates put the output share of state-owned companies at 44% and their 
share of retail sales at only 41%.  If we look at recent growth rates in the different sectors, 
the  importance of the  non-state  sector is  bound to  continue  its  upward trend.  Another 
feature has been the growing variety of  different types of  enterprise, from the township and 
village enterprises of the countryside to the burgeoning foreign invested joint ventures. 
c)  Smashing the iron rice bowl: the key to the Chinese reform process in the years to come 
is very probably going to be the sensitive issue of restructuring the  huge, inefficient and 
loss-making state-owned industry, over 100,000 enterprises, of which about  11,000 are 
medium or large sized, employing some 100 million workers, of whom one-third could be 
made redundant. By 1994, some 40% of the state-owned companies were losing money (by 
official calculations).  Their combined losses rose by  30% in  1994,  and those still in  the 
black saw a sharp decline in profits, leading to 4.7 $billion of public subsidies (60% of the 
total  public  deficit).  The  debt  chain  between  different  companies  is  surging  (some 
estimates put it at 69 $ billion) making restructuring of China's public industry all the more 
crucial but, also, more difficult. 
Failure to tackle this sector will continue to undermine China's modernisation drive; but a 
destructive approach could have enormous social, economic and  political  consequences. 
Reform  has  so  far  been  hesitant  in  this  area.  Besides  a  modest  attempt  at  separating 
ownership and  management  (the  contract management responsibility system)  and  partial 
separation of companies and the state by taxing profits and allowing some profit retention 
autonomy, few  measures have really attacked the core of the  problem_  When  U1ey  have, 
like the  Bankruptcy Law,  they  remain just a declaration of good intentions  implemented 
only  sporadically.  This  sector  as  a  whole  remains  a  serious  brake  on  China's  future 
development. EU-China Trade 
In  parallel  with China's booming total  trade, the  bilateral trade flows  between the EU  and 
China have also surged. Total bilateral trade in 1978 was only 2.4 billion ECU (EC- 9), but by 
1993  this  had  boomed  to  30.8  billion  ECU (EC-12).  EU-China trade  has  increased  almost 
thirteen-fold since the beginning of reform .in China (sec statistical annex). 
The EC enjoyed a positive trade balance between 1983 and 1987, reaching a peak in  1985 
with a  3.2 billion ECU trade surplus vis-a-vis China. Since  1988, however, the situation has 
changed dramatically.  China enjoyed a  1.2 billion ECU trade surplus that year and from then 
until  1991, doubled it every single year. However, after growth in the surplus slowed in 1992, 
1993 showed a reversal of the trend.  EU exports grew by 65%, leading to the first reduction 
of our bilateral  trade  deficit  since  1988,  to  8.2  billion  ECU.  It  should be  noted  that,  in 
contrast, the  US  trade deficit vis-a-vis China continued to grow rapidly during  1992- 1994, 
reaching  30  $  billion  last  yc<u.  But  the  available  figures  for  1994  indicate  that  China's 
bilateral trade surplus  with the  EU has started to grow again,  and  could have exceeded  10 
billion ECU. 
Of course, despite many efforts to  analyse the reasons for  discrepancies between EU and 
Chinese statistics, these rem<Jin  sigr1ificant.  For example, Chinese figures showed a bilateral 
trade  surplus  for  the  EU of 2.4 $  million in  1993.  Both  Eurostat  and  a  GATT statistics 
subgroup have explained tbe>:sc  discrepancies as the result of differences over how to include 
Hong Kong re-export figures in the statistks. 
Concerning trade by prod  net ~ategory, EU exports continue to be  concentrated in areas like 
machinery, both mechanical and electrical, transport equipment, and nuclear reactors,  which 
amounted to over 65% of total EU exports to China in  1993.  As for  Chinese exports to  the 
EC,  the  ma.in  items continue to be  textiles and clothing (20% of the  total),  toys,  electrical 
material,  leather goods ancl  footwear.  ·n1cse five categories together represent over 57% of 
total EC imports from China in  1993. 
A  longer term analysis of EU's  trade performance in China shows  the  Community slightly 
losing market share in the Chjnese import market during tile  1980s.  The EC (9) had a  12% 
share of Chinese imports in  1980, and the EC (10) reached a  13% share in  1985. But the EC 
( 12)  fell  to  11%  in  1990.  However,  this  slight  reduction  compares  favourably  with  the 
collapse of US  (from 19% in  1980 to 8% in 1990) and Japanese (from 26'1(,  in  1980 to 10% in 
1990) shares in the total of China's imports in the same period.  Therefore. the US,  the EU and 
Japan all  lost  market  share in  Cll.ina  during  the  1980s, but the EU ma11aged  to  retain its 
relative position much more successfully than its competitors.  Recent figures  suggest a 
growth in market share for the EU (around 15%), less dramatic than tiJat of Japan, but more 
impressive than a stagnant US  position.  It is  also worth noting that, in  contrast to  the US, the 
EU share of the Chinese market is  higher than those enjoyed in  (Jih:'r Asian  markets 
such as the NICs, ASEAN or Japan. 
A positive factor in China's surging exports to the EU has undoubtedly been the Community's 
GSP system.  It  should be  noted that  China has been, by far,  the  biggest beneficiary of the 
EU  GSP in recent years.  China's expor1s enjoying GSP benefits jumped from 2.1  billion EClJ 
in  I  <)~8 to  6. 6  billion r:cu  in  1992 and  the  Chinese share in  the  t11! a!  benefits  of the  EC 
system went up  from  13.7% to 22.7.%, three times as mtich as the <;ecun:l  hcncf!ciary. Investment 
Foreign bor-rowing  by China and foreign direct investment in China have also been growing 
rapidly since the beginning of reforms. Foreign Direct Investment exploded in  1992 and  1993. 
In the period  l97919<J2, China borrowed almost 75  $ billion (60 $ billion actually disbursed) 
and  foreign  companies  set  up  90,710 joint ventures,  with  a total  value  contracted  of II 0 $ 
billion and 36 $billion actually used.  FDI in China grew even more rapidly in  1993, reaching 
Ill $ billion  uf contracts and 25.8  $ billion actually used  for  the  83,000 new joint ventures 
established.  Figures  tor  1994  showed  a  decrease  in  the  amount  of projects  (47 ,490)  and 
contracted  FO!  (much  of which  was  simply  Chinese  capital  going  through  Hong  Kong  to 
benefit from  an  advantageous FDI  regime) but another growth in used foreign capital to  over 
33.8 $billion.  All  in  all, in  the 1979-1994 period, over 221,000 of Joint Ventures have 
been created, over 301 $ billion have been pledged and over 95 $ billion actually invested 
in China.  They employ some 12  million Chinese workers and they represent around 40% of 
China's total foreign trade. 
Hong Kong and l\1acau  companies are  by  far  the  biggest investors  in  China, with  114,147. 
projects,  150 $billion of contracts and some 50$ billion disbursed between  1979 and  1993. 
This represents around two-thirds of projects and contracts and three-quarters of used foreign 
capital.  Taiwan comes second, increasing to 3/4 the share of FDI of Chinese origin.  From the 
rest, the performance of the EU,  USA and 1  apan in tl1e  period 1979-1993 can be summarised 
as follows: 
Projects  Contracts  Us'-'d 
($million)  ($million) 
EU (12)  2,741  6,952  2,442 
EU (15)  3,070  7,319  2,549 
USA  12,019  14,659  5,237 
JAPAN  7,182  8,935  5,203 
'n1erefore, EU investment lags behind that of the main cumpditors botl1  in  terms  of number 
of joint ventures and  capital  invested.  However, these  figures  show that tl1e  average size of 
EU  projects  tends  to  be  bigger  than  those  of other origin.  Both the  USA  and  Japan  have 
invested a similar amount, 5 $ billion, to Taiwan, more that  t\vice the EU  figure.  In terms  of 
Member States, the biggest investors in China are: 
Projects 
FRANCE  547 
UK.  616 
GERMANY  569 
ITALY  467 
Cmtt•·.,ci~d 
Capiial 
($million) 
920 
3,018 
1,458 
552 
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602 
578 
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22 706 
12 447 
-10 259 
7 644 
5 320 
-2 324 
I9 639  6 869 
II 339  4 955 
-8 300  -I 9I4 
JANUARY-DECEMBER I994 
2 651 
1 826 
-825 
2 629 
1 921 
-708 
1 732 
537 
-1  195 
JANUARY-DECEMBER 1993 
2 397 
I 377 
-1  020 
2 214 
2 I08 
-I06 
I 403 
596 
-807 
1 484 
910 
-574 
I 263 
608 
-655 
4 280 
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-3 220 
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946 
-2 563 
207 
27 
-I80 
205 
25 
-180 
536 
145 
-391 
503 
1I5 
-388 
233 
15 
-218 
248 
36 
-212 
I  174 
672 
-502 
870 
547 
-323 
From  January-December 1993 until  January-December 1994, EC imports increased  15,6%, the exports 9,8% and the community balance passed 
from  -8 300 to  -10 527 millions ofEcu. 
Source: EUROST  AT  -Estimate for november-december 1994, for the Netherlands and Greece 
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EUR 12  D 
1992-1993  COMMUNITY TRADE WITH CHINA 
Ecu millions 
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JANUARY-DECEMBER 1993 
19 528  6 868  2 420  2 215  1 276  1 263  3 509  205  502  248  875  157 
11  302  4 955  1 338  2 108  599  608  946  25  114  36  544  29 
-8 236  -1  913  -1  082  -107  -677  -655  -2 563  -180  -388  -212  -331  -128 
JANUARY-DECEMBER 1992 
16 783  5 423  1 941  2 148  1 603  1 012  2 672  140  545  184  1 031  84 
6 852  2 852  1 250  I  144  340  341  578  12  98  14  209  14 
-9 931  -2 571  -691  -1  004  -1  263  -671  -2 094  -128  -447  -170  -822  -70 
From January-December 1992 until January-December 1993,  community imports increased 16,4%, exports 64,9% and the community balance passed from 
-9 931  to  -8 236 Ecu millions (-17%) 
Source  EUROSTAT 
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0  l COMMUNITY EXPORTS TO CHINA BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITY!) 
Ecu millions 
Code2  Product 
S-l  Nuclear reactors, boilers, machin. & mechanical appliances  .. 
87  Vehicles other than railway or tramway rollingstock.. 
85  Electr. machin. & equipment Television image  Sound/ image reproducers 
00  Products classified as secret 
90  Optical, photogr., cinematogr., measuring, prcision, medical instruments  .. 
29  Organic chemicals 
73  Articles of  iron or steel 
88  Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof 
72  Iron and steel 
39  Plastics and articles thereof 
38  Miscellaneous chemical products 
31  Fertilisers 
55  Man-made staple fibres 
48  Paper and paperboard ; articles of  paper pulp, of  paper or paperboard 
30  Pharmaceutical products 
51  Wool, animal hair, horsehair yarn and woven fabric 
89  Ships, boats and floating structures 
76  Aluminium and articles tfereof 
32  Tanning extracts. Tannins, dyes, pigments, paints, mastics and inks 
Total of  the 19 products 
Total exports to China 
-----------------------------------
I) Source: EUROST  AT  (EUR 12) 
2) Combined Nomenclature 
w 
c 
1989 
2 491 
305 
518 
216 
199 
194 
343 
265 
350 
119 
73 
77 
105 
49 
23 
67 
115 
50 
24 
6 372 
1990  1991 
2 250  1 921 
232  464 
571  691 
224  390 
191  223 
186  261 
249  237 
14  8 
97  92 
69  154 
73  98 
97  121 
97  99 
40  63 
30  36 
29  51 
101  30 
23  33  . 
22  35 
5 271  5 605 
1992  1993 
2 491  2 724 
935  I  312 
744  1341 
393  393 
235  331 
219  271 
163  276 
258  403 
261  1 051 
131  145 
89  72 
83  50 
73  39 
69  54 
46  36 
43  43 
37  49 
39  29 
32  30 
10 648 
6 852  11  339 
0/o on 
93 total 
416 
II 5 
II 8 
3 5 
29 
2.4 
2.4 
3.6 
93 
1.3 
0.6 
0.4 
03 
0.5 
0.3 
0.4 
0.4 
03 
03 
93.2 
100,0 COMMUNITY IMPORTS FROM CHINA BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITY!) 
Ecu millions 
Code 2)  Product  1989  1990  1991 
61/63  Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, other made-up textile articles  ...  1 482  2 127  2 249 
95  Toys, games, and sports requisites  911  1 077  I 680 
85  Electr. machin. &  equipment. Television image. Sound/image reproducers  896  I 306  1 679 
42  Articles of  leather, travel goods, handbags, ...  551  710  I 029 
64  Footwear  224  267  526 
84  Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery &  mechanical appliances ..  196  267  438 
39/40  Plastics &  articles thereof; rubber &  articles thereof  195  255  374 
67  Prepared feathers and down. Artificial flowers, articles of  human hear  196  223  314 
94  Furniture; bedding, matresses, cushions; lamps  .... Prefabricated buildings  87  121  235 
07  Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers  168  160  291 
91  Clocks and watches and parts thereof  139  145  204 
50  Silk  519  359  275 
73  Articles of  iron or steel  139  163  204 
82  Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, ofbase metal...  129  136  210 
65/66  Headgear, umbrellas, walking sticks, seat sticks, whips, riding-crops  ...  95  113  164 
27  Mineral fuels, mineral oils & products of  their distillation ....  167  129  161 
46  Manufactures of  straw, of  esparto  ...  Basketware & wickerwork  133  127  147 
51  Wool, fine or coars animal hair; horsehair yam and woven fabric  183  115  146 
57  Carpets and other textile floor coverings  128  117  146 
12  Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruits ....  107  137  224 
20  Preparations of  vegetables, fruit, nuts, or other parts of  plants  113  132  153 
28  Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of  precious metals  ..  199  133  163 
52  Cotton  149  149  120 
d  Total of  the 23  products  6 910  8 201  II 899 
h  Total imports from China  9 148  10 587  14 972 
-----------------------------------------
I l Source  EUROSTAT  (EUR 12) 
2) Combined Nomenclature 
w 
\-1. 
1992 
2 489 
2 108 
2 071 
1 135 
728 
586 
451 
314 
318 
247 
261 
241 
247 
202 
178 
162 
148 
148 
145 
136 
147 
113 
105 
12 094 
16 783 
0/o on 
1993  93 total 
3 923  20 1 
2 359  12  1 
2 710  13  9 
I 305  6.7 
877  45 
898  4.6 
572  2.9 
311  1.6 
475  24 
230  1.2 
288  1.5 
212  11 
297  1.5 
258  1.3 
238  12 
135  0.7 
152  0.8 
141  07 
156  0.8 
132  07 
116  0.6 
!54  08 
115  06 
16 054  82 2 
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Evolution of direct investment of the European Union 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  !990  1991  1992  1993 
•  Contracted investment  ~ Used investment 
Evolution of the amount of direct investment of the European Union 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 Direct  investment  in  China  (up  to  December  31.  1993) 
Countries 
United  Kingdom 
Germany 
France 
Ita I y 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Ire I  and 
Luxembourg 
Portugal 
Greece 
EU  (12) 
Austria 
Sweden 
Finland 
EU  (15) 
USA 
Japan 
Number  of  Projects 
616 
569 
547 
467 
191 
168 
100 
51 
8 
13 
9 
2 
------
2.741 
174 
133 
22 
3.070 
12.019 
7. 182 
Contracted  Amount  Realised  Amount 
(US$  mIn.) 
3,018 
1. 458 
920 
5,52 
406 
289 
137 
102 
49 
16 
5 
0.5 
-------
6.952,5 
187 
150 
30 
7.319,5 
14.659 
8.935 
(US$  rn In. ) 
578 
527 
602 
397 
176 
24 
67 
63 
5 
2.3 
0.3 
-------
2.442 
35 
42 
30 
2.549 
5  237 
5  203 Following continuous pressure by China's trading partners, both bilaterally, and  multilaterally 
in the GATT accession discussions, some improvements have been made to the Chinese trade 
system. 
a)  centralisation of foreign trade rules publication in a single office and publication of all 
existing rules to increase transparency (not yet fully implemented).  The first ever Foreign 
Trade  Law  was  adopted  in  May  1994  and  entered  into  force  in July  (although  some 
provisions seem not fully GAIT-compatible); 
b)  lowering of certain customs duties; 
c)  reduction in  the  number of products  subject to  import licences or quotas:  as  of June 
1994, a total of 413 items were still subject to NTM's without renewal plans; abolition of 
import substitution policies and import and export planning;  · 
d)  elimination  of  the  import  regulatory  tax,  direct  export  subsidies  and  the  import 
substitution policy; 
e)  elimination of the official exchange rate as of 1 January 1994 and unification of China's 
exchange rate at the swaps market rate, whose floating is controlled; 
f)  introduction of VAT, a uniform corporate tax and improved budget accounting rules; 
g)  conversion of some state owned enterprises to shareholding or limited liability companies, 
subcontracting of management of some remaining state owned enterprises, creation of a 
bankruptcy law. 
Although these  measures represent important steps forward, they are clearly insufficient to 
make  the  Chinese trade system compatible with internationally accepted rules.  Remaining 
problems include : 
Absence of transparency, certainty and uniformity 
Trade planning (plans which are often secret) 
Trade monopolies and other privileges of foreign trade corporations 
Foreign currency controls 
Very high customs tariffs 
Licensing system, quotas, tendering, and other import restrictions 
Tendering restrictions on imports 
Technical,  veterinary  and  phytosanitary  measures  used  not  always  in  accordance  with 
international rules 
Export subsidies (mostly indirect) 
Export taxes and restrictions 
Industrial policies which can have a severe impact on trade and investment conditions, for 
example in the automobile sector. 
Th.is  list of measures clearly shows the dilemma for  an exporter who has to  face  not only the 
classic deterrent of high  customs duties  and  the  requirement of an  import  licence,  but  also 
uncertainty about the rules applied, which are often unpublished and implemented on an ad hoc 
basis.  Secret trade plans, import substitution policies carried out by the sectoral Ministries and 
foreign currency controls amount to a system which lacks transparency and certainty. Bilateral Trade Discussions 
A bilateral trade deficit of 8-10 billion ECU in the last four years deserves close analysis.  Of 
course,  bilateral  trade  imbalances  are  not  a  problem  in themselves,  but  only  if they  reflect 
structures and practices which are not compatible with free and fair trade rules. We believe this 
is the case in China. 
In  order to deal more effectively with this problem, the Joint Committee, in  its October 1991 
meeting, decided to hold  a Trade Experts' Meeting (which further evolved into  a series of 
periodical discussions) to examine the specific problems hampering the adequate development 
of  trade.  The  agendas  of  those  meetings  have  included  not  only  specific  problems 
(phytosanitary and  veterinary  matters,  industrial  metals,  footwear,  silk,  alcoholic  beverages, 
services) but also horizontal issues (transparency, foreign exchange controls, etc.). 
The  purpose  of these  meetings  was  threefold.  First,  to  increase  mutual  understanding  on 
outstanding contentious issues  and  maintain pressure on the Chinese authorities to ease  the 
existing problems; second to seek solutions to specific problems of EU interest; and finally, to 
avoid any discrimination that might result from China's deals with other partners, in particular 
with the US.  Of course,  most of the  main issues of contention about access to the Chinese 
market  are  now  being  addressed  also  in the context of the  negotiations  on Chinese  WTO 
accession. 
The Joint Committee of April  1993 decided to set up  a Working Group on Economic and 
Trade matters in ordt;r to  institutionalise the on-going trade discussions.  During  the  Joint 
Committee meeting of February 1994 it was decided to supplement the Economic and Trade 
Working Group with three sectoral meetings on Financial Services, IPR and Agriculture. 
Other sectors could be added in the  future.  This approach of backing up a global  summary 
meeting on ec0nomic matters with detailed technical-level discussions is designed to ensure a 
realistic and fruitful dialogue: a genuine attempt to improve mutual understanding and facilitate 
economic ties between two important commercial partners. 
The EU has raised bilaterally, a variety of sectoral issues in recent years. 
Non-ferrous Metals (notably the surge of imports at abnormally low prices which are  at 
the origin of several anti-dumping procedures); 
Silk Products (in  particular  double  pricing  policies  which  lead  to  manufactured  goods 
being sold by China more cheaply that the raw material); 
Alcoholic Beverages (the whole import regime, including the import monopoly, extremely 
high customs duties, unknown rules for trading and taxation, and unpublished import plans 
and quotas); 
Financial Services (limitation in the activities of foreign banks and  insurance companies, 
possibility or establishment in areas like commerce, consulting and law firms); 
Agriculture (phytosanitary  and  veterinary  measures  which  hamper trade  in  sectors  like 
bovine  meat,  tobacco,  and  dairy  products;  discussion  for  concluding  an  administrative 
arrangement to govern phytosanitary and veterinary matters; and a request for an EC unit to 
be set up in the China Commodity Inspection Bureau); 
IPR  (proper  enforcement  of existing  legislation,  notably  infringements  in  the  area  of 
trademarks and unfair competition (counterfeiting and passing off), copyrights,  as  well  a.<> 
proper implementation of agreements on pipeline patent protection; 
Shipping (proper application of the 1992 Agreed Minutes, not yet fully achieved); Technical  Barriers  (the  whole  system  remains  non-transparent,  m1xmg  up  private  and 
public  inspection  and  is  not  always  based  on  international  standards  leading  to  trade 
obstacles as, for example, in the field of chemicals); 
Taxation (in particular the new  VAT, which  include discriminatory elements for  foreign 
companies, and Consumption Tax); 
National  Treatment  for  foreign-funded  companies  (constraints  and  discriminations 
affecting their operation in China). 
Potential discrimination emerged after the US  launched a first Section 301 investigation of the 
issue of intellectual property rights in 1991.  A Memorandum of Understanding between the US 
and  China  provided  for  a  substantial  improvement  in  the  level  of patent  and  copyright 
protection in China.  The MOU contained, however, provisions that would have discriminated 
against  the  Community.  The subsequent dialogue  with  China  led to  an  agreement on the 
subject,  avoiding  what  could  have  been  a  major  trade  conflict.  Discrimination  of  the 
Community vis-a-vis the  US  has  also been prevented by negotiations in the area of maritime 
transport. 
A second investigation under Section 301  was launched on the general question of access to 
the Chinese market for US exports.  A compromise solution was finally reached and the US 
and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 10 October 1.992 in which China agreed 
to publish all  Jaws, regulations, rules, decrees, administrative guidance and policies affecting 
trade.  Unpublished rules will no longer be enforceable and publication will be centralised in 
one official  journal.  In  addition,  China agreed to  progressively  reduce import restrictions, 
quotas,  licensing  requirements  and  controls;  to  give confirmation on the  elimination of all 
import substitution rules and policies; to avoid the utilisation of veterinary and phytosanitary 
standards  and  testing  requirements  as  import  barriers,  applying  the  same  requirements  to 
domestic and imported products; and to reduce tariffs on several products.  It was clear that the 
benefits of the agreement would be enjoyed by all of China's trading partners, particularly in 
terms of transparency.  But concern was expressed about one discriminatory element, a special 
provision allowing unrestricted importation of  sp~e  parts and kits only for US automobile joint 
ventures.  The Chinese govemment accepted an exchange of letters  whereby EU  companies 
will  enjoy exactly the same treatment, and agreed to consider EU's priority products for early 
liberalisation. 
The  recent  US-China  agreement  on  several  IPR  issues,  most  notably  on  copyrights 
enforcement, is  another step,  as  long  as  it  is  applied erga omnes,  towards  not  only  better 
Chinese  legislation  but,  particularly,  adequate enforcement of it.  The Commission should 
make sure that EU products enjoy the same protection granted to US ones, de jure of course but 
particularly in practice, and that the provisions regarding joint ventures and market access 
are extended to EU companies and products. 
EC Import Regime 
Following the completion of the internal  market,  a review took place of the rules  re~ulating a 
variety of nationally-set quotas, some 4,700 quotas on Chinese products were in place  .  At the 
same  time,  this  substantial  liberalisation  was  only  acceptable  to  European  industry  when 
accomranied  by  a  minimum,  of protection,  in  view  of  t11e  unique  nature  of the  Chinese 
economy and its consequent potential to disrupt the EU market in some sectors. 
Regulation 3420/83 
36 In the wake of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the abolition of all national QRs and the 
establishment  of a  few  EU-wide  was  agreed.  nus new  regime  puts  only  seven  product 
categories  ~nder quota  (footwear,  gloves,  tableware  and  kitchenware,  glassware,  radio-
broadcast receivers and toys) which represent around 13% of Chinese non-textile.exports to the 
EU  (in  1992).  Other products will  be  subject to a surveillance regime with  no  quantitative 
limitation. 
A new import regime was also established for Non-MFA textiles products, particularly silk and 
silk products.  This autonomous regime has been negotiated with the Chinese and was soon 
transformed into a bilateral agreement. 
It is clear that this new regime represents a substantial improvement on the old one, not only in 
terms  of scope  (volume  of trade  and  number  of products  covered)  but  alsq  in  terms  of 
transparency and certainty.  In addition, the quota levels have been substantially raised in 
1995 to take account both of  enlargement and of  specific problems in certain sectors. Financial and Technical Assistance 
The first  project  to  be  financed  by  the  European Community came in  1984, just before  the 
normalisation of cooperation activities through the Trade and Cooperation Agreement.  A full-
scale development aid  programme developed in the wake of the signing of the  Agreement in 
1985.  To the end of 1994, the EC financed a total of 25 development projects in China in the 
tield of technical and financial assistance, by far the bulk of  total resources devoted to relations 
with  China.  Projects  have  tended  to  combine expert advice on the  spot,  some  training  of 
Chinese in the EU,  and support towards the modernisation of equipment.  The projects have 
centred on the rural sector in its broadest sense, covering such varied fields as soil and water 
conservation, food  processing and storage,  as well as the improvement of crop yields.  The 
programme was designed to spread the influence of the EC into a  variety of sectors, and  a 
variety of provinces.  As a result, the programmes have touched on products as  varied as citrus. 
fruits  and cashew nuts, shrimps and rubber.  The geographical spread of activities has meant" 
that the work has spread from Xinjiang in the west to Liaoning in the east, and from Jilin in the 
north to Hainan in the south. 
One result has been that starting from scratch, an EC presence was established in diverse parts 
of China.  The importance of the programme has also been given added force by the fact that 
few other foreign donors have entered the rural sector in China.  However, in the face of such a 
vast country as  China, the overall effect of a such a programme has necessarily been small.  It 
has proved difficult to establish a national profile through the adoption of such a "bottom-up" 
strategy.  In operational terms, the pooling of knowledge and experience between EU expert 
teams separated across the corintry has not been achieved.  A further problem has been that at a 
time of rapid change in China, institutional partners sometimes find it difficult to fulfil  their 
long-term commitments. 
The  largest  single  technical  and  financial  assistance  project  in China has  been the  Dairy 
Development Project.  The central aim of the project was to improve nutrition standards in 
China through supporting the dairy sector.  First, EC milk powder and butter oil  were made 
available to China at local prices.  Then the proceeds were ploughed back into the development 
of the dairy industry in China.  European experts from  across the EC were sent to China to 
advise on the evolution of a sound dairy industry, cattle stocks were built up, and equipment 
was provided to enlarging the milk processing capability in China.  The project was one of few 
foreign-funded projects in the heart of the Chinese rural sector, and the only EU project to have 
developed  a  network  approach  with  true  national  scope  and  participation.  The  project 
promoted and modernised the dairy sector in 20 major municipalities and established a national 
strategy for the dairy sector.  It set up structures and introduced new technology to ensure that 
the dairy products market and dairy production develop in tandem.  A one year interim phase 
for the project agreed in  1994 involves 30 project areas and has moved away from supporting 
mainly milk processing capacity and the increase of cattle numbers towards strengthening the 
productivity of dairy farming and improving quality control throughout the dairy sector. 
The Commission has  now launched a feasibility study of a possible second phase.  The study is 
examining the  extension  of the  project to  have  an  impact  from  the  farm  level  right  to  the 
marketplace,  addressing  weaknesses  such  as  quality  control,  hygiene  and  productivity  to 
improve the  responsiveness of the  industry  to  the  market.  The commercial  orientation  of a 
second phase could include measures to promote the EU investment in the Chinese dairy sector. 
To  develop  projects  on  such  a  national  scale  obviously  requires  greater  resources  and 
infrastructure.  Anot11er  approach which has  increasingly been adopted is  to adopt a policy of institutional strengthening, supporting the development of policy  at  the  centre.  With  this  in 
mind,  the  China EC Centre for  Agricultural  Technology  (CECA  T)  was  established  in 
Beijing.  lll,is Centre was set up  to encourage the transfer of technology between the EC  and 
China, and to consolidate the experience gained from the development aid of the ~C  and others 
over many years- to develop a~  of knowledge and know-how. CECAT seeks to spread the 
benefits of this work to as wide an audience as  possible through seminars, special papers and 
audio-visual  material,  and  by  assisting  European  agro-businesses  operating  in  the  Chinese 
market.  With current CECAT arrangements corning to an end next year, an assessment will be 
made  to judge whether the Centre should continue on its  current institutional  footing  for  a 
second phase. 
The objective of supporting  minority populations in  China has  been  pursued  by  defining 
projects in such a way that the benefits flow to minorities, for example by targeting regions or 
sectors  in  which  minorities  are  concentrated.  For example,  an  ongoing  project to  develop 
livestock in Qinghai  province  targets  the  upland  areas,  where  farmers  come  largely  from-
Tibetan stock. 
Economic Cooperation 
In parallel. with the programme of technical and financial assistance, a programme of economic 
cooperation developed in the  1980s.  Tills programme also sought to combine action at the 
local. level with institutional strengthening at the centre. 
During the late 1980s, the largest project at the micro level was  a programme to support the 
modernisation  of ChineSe  enterprises.  1bis  programme  took  advantage  of Consultancy 
expertise within. the EU to address the particUlar needs of Chinese companies in transition. 
However, it proved difficult to ensure that the programme had a knock-on effect throughout the 
country, and its implementation was  discontinued after  1989.  A more successful  attempt to 
strengthen  the  infrastructure  of the  Chinese  economy ·came  in  the  field  of management 
education.  From  1985,  the  China-Europe  Management  Institute  (CEMI)  offered 
management  training  to  Chinese  students,  with  European  faculty  teaching  courses  on 
management with  an  international  focus.  ItS  main task  was  the. establishment of an  MBA 
course, through which some 235  students have graduated. The MBA courses provided a new 
dimension to management training in China, a course with an international focus which quickly 
achieved an impressive reputation.  CEMI also undertook research, producing publications and 
case studies,  and  in recent years  placed a  much greater emphasis on developing  a range  of 
management development courses, from  which some 600 students have benefited since  1989. 
A variety of companies, from state owned companies to foreign joint ventures, were involved 
with CEMI,  with close links  to  European companies.  The CEMI  MBA  alumni  ca,n  now  be 
found in some of the most dynamic sectors of the Chinese economy.  However, CEMI was not 
without  its problems,  notably  poor facilities  and a lack of independence which  prevented  it 
from establishing long-term stability and sustainability. 
1994 saw the EU's efforts to develop management training in China enter a new phase.  As  the 
work  of  CEMI  continued,  it  gradually  became  clear  to  the  Commission,  the  Chinese 
government, and the business community in China and the EU  that  the  time  had  come  for  a 
more  ambitious  attempt  to  address  the  severe  shortage  of Chinese  managers  trained  to 
international  standards.  1l1e  result  was  the  China-Europe International  Business  School 
(CEIBS), a fully-fledged business school set up in Shanghai in  1994.  A partnership between a 
network of business schools in Europe and the Shanghai Jiaotong University, CEIBS is the first 
business  school  in  China,  offering  international-level  MBA  and  other  courses  to  Chinese 
!9 students from March 1995. 
A  permanent  faculty  source primarily in  EU  business schools will  be built  up,  housed  in  a 
building con·structed specifically for the school.  CEIBS is an independent legal entity, managed 
through a Board of Directors in much the same way as a commercial joint venture, although it 
is  non-profit making.  TI1e  academic standard of the School is  monitored and  protected by an 
international  group of scholars in an  Academic Council,  whilst sponsors of the  project  will 
influence the development of the School through an Advisory Council.  Close links  with the 
business community are central to CEIBS' philosophy, not only as  sponsors but to ensure the 
continuing economic relevance of CEIBS's teaching to the modern Chinese economy.  CEIBS 
symbolises a new concern to ensure that actions are properly in tune with the economic realities 
in China, as well as respecting the requirement that economic cooperation is o_f genuine mutual 
benefit. 
An<;>ther element in  the programme has been the provision of training to officials, where the 
EU  could offer  particular  expertise  and  support.  One example  has  been  a  programme  of 
training for Chinese interpreters, to facilitate the internationalisation of key parts of the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. Since 
these interpreters later go on to policy-making roles in their ministries,  the  programme  now 
includes an element to teach the interpreters about key issues concerning the European Union 
and the world  trading  system.  Almost  150  interpreters  have  now  benefited from  intensive 
training at the Commission's Joint Interpreting  and Conference Service.  Another important 
example has been a programme of customs cooperation, aiming to facilitate trade by supporting 
the modernisation of customs authorities in China. 
The complaints of the international community about standards of IPR protection in China are 
well known.  But if China's efforts to develop an effective legal framework for IPR protection 
are to succeed, they will need technical assistance from the international community.  With this 
in mind, the EU and  the European Patent Office launched an industrial  property training 
programme in  China in  1993.  The objective of the programme was not only to help bring 
Chinese legislation into line with international norms, but to assist the institutions in charge of 
implementing the laws, to encourage the development of an industrial property profession, and 
to  improve  awareness  about  the  importance  of effective  IPR  protection  to  the  healthy 
development of a  modern  economy.  So a  variety  of training  schemes  and  symposia  were 
organised  for  officials,  lawyers,  judges  and  businessmen,  as  well  as  the  provision  of key 
documentation. 
Another example  has  been an ongoing  programme  to  train  economists  from  key  ministries 
involved  in  economic reform  in  China.  This  has  combined an  introductory  course  on  the 
economies of the EU  and a series of seminars with a month-long stage in important economic 
institutions in Europe.  The objective is  to help economists learn more about the realities of 
how  market economies function in Europe.  Issues of particular interest to China and  with a 
particular EU interest, such as  regional  policy or monetary policy, are given special weight in 
the programme.  Other training has  been organised in  the  field  of accountancy and  financial 
management, customs administration, and cooperation between statistical authorities. 
Finally, a series of activities hav~ been developed to encourage business-to-business contact, 
facilitating the establishment of business cooperation between entrepreneurs  from  China and 
from Europe.  Such action has largely taken the form either of participation at trade fairs, or of 
organising  business  meetings  and  seminars  with  complementary  participants  "matched"  in 
advance.  A  particular  stress  has  been  put  on  actions  involving  small  and  medium  sized 
4o companies.  European companies have also becorne increasingly interested in  the  possibilities 
for developing joint ventures in China offered by the European Community Investment Partners 
(ECIP) facility,  which provides a variety of grants and loans to encourage European firms  to 
establish joint  ventures in  several  Asian countries, including  China.  Over  100  companies  or 
organisations  have  taken  advantage  of the  ECIP scheme  to  encourage  EU  joint ventures  in 
China.  China is now proving the most popular destination for ECIP applicants. 
Science and Technology Cooperation with .China 
Scientific cooperation between the Community and China began in 1984.  For some years, the 
programme of cooperation centred on short-term activities including seminars and training.  But 
in recent years, the focus  has shifted to the implementation of joint research activities with a 
high  added  value  scientific  content  and  involving  research  institutes  on  topics  of mutual 
interest.  More than  70 joint research  projects  have  been funded,  notably  in  biotechnology 
applied to agriculture and medicine, health, thermonuclear fusion, and environmental sciences. 
including  global  change,  earth  observation  and  monitoring,  which  have  established  firm 
foundations  for  cooperation.  In addition,  several scientific workshops on these sectors have 
been organised in China, and more than 150 young scientists have received research grants to 
work  in  a  variety  of European  institutions  and  laboratories.  Cooperation  in  the  area  of 
biotechnology, one of the core areas for  cooperation with China, is  coordinated by the  EC-
China Biotechnology Centre, a joint initiative set up in 1991  to act as  an  information bureau 
and a catalyst for EU/China interaction. 
The onset of the Fourth Framework Programme (1994-1998) has introduced new possibilities 
for  scientific  cooperation  with  China,  supporting  innovative  research,  mobilising 
complementary  skills,  developing  human  capital,  training  young  researchers  and  generally 
fostering a culture of research. 
Other cooperation 
Cooperation  has  been  undertaken  in  sectors  of  economic  significance  to  EU  business. 
Industrial cooperation has been developed in a number of areas of technological importance, 
with  direct  industrial  projects  (such  as  in  the  field  of computer  integrated  manufacturing), 
promotion of the use of European standards and localisation of European products (such as  in 
the  field  of software),  as  well  as  research  cooperation  in  the  industrial  environment.  An 
important programme of telecommunications cooperation has been defined and launched in 
close cooperation with the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC), the Ministry of 
Posts and Telecommunications, the  Ministry of Electronics and  Industry and the  Ministry of 
Radio,  Film  and  TV,  including  institutional  strengthening  of the  SSTC's  own  information 
network.  This  programme  concerns  two  major  long-term  initiatives  in  areas  of advanced 
technology, to support the use of the GSM standard for mobile communications, and to develop 
digital  audio and video broadcasting technology. Energy cooperation began as  early as  1981, 
and has sought to encourage the development of energy policy-making in China. with technical 
assistance  to  energy  resource  development  and  training  in  best  practice.  Amongst  specific 
projects has been support for the gas industry in exploration and extraction techniques.  In all of 
these cases, a genuine mutual  interest has resulted from  the transfer of technology and know-
how to China through the use of European products, making such products progressively more 
familiar to the Chinese market. 
But  cooperation  has  not  been  limited  to  areas  of interest  to  business.  Following  contact 
between European and Chinese universities in  1986, a small-scale programme in the  field of 
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j higher education was organised.  This built on a fledgling network of European studies bodies 
in Chinese universities (the Chinese Society for EC Studies), seven of which are now European 
Documentation Centres.  An annual  programme was developed made up  of a summer school 
for  Chinese students,  with  European  lecturers  teaching  European  studies,  and  a  number  of 
scholarships for Chinese doctoral-level students.  In 1994, an initiative was also !ilUnched in the 
context  of the  EU's  worldwide  programme  to  combat  AIDSIHIV  and  sexually  transmitted 
diseases.  The  objective  is  to  support  the  Chinese  government's  efforts  to  build  up  an 
administrative and medical infrastructure to combat these diseases. 
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